Online citations, reference lists, and bibliographies.
Please confirm you are human
(Sign Up for free to never see this)
← Back to Search

Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, And The Rewards To Legislator Reputation*

R. Kroszner, T. Stratmann
Published 2005 · Economics

Save to my Library
Download PDF
Analyze on Scholarcy
Share
Are politicians who follow a strategy of reputational development rewarded with high levels of corporate campaign contributions? Reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to greater campaign contributions from favored interests. Alternatively, such clarity could alienate those who disagree and prevent the politician from obtaining contributions from groups on both sides of an issue. We outline an approach that considers conditions under which a politician would or would not prefer reputational development and policy‐stance clarity and consistency in the context of repeat dealing with special interests. Our proxy for reputational development is the percentage of repeat givers to a legislator. Using data on corporate political action committee (PAC) contributions to members of the U.S. House during the seven electoral cycles from 1983/84 to 1995/96, we explore a variety of alternative hypotheses and find that greater reputational development is rewarded with greater PAC contributions.
This paper references
An Efficient Method for Fitting Seemingly
Zellner (1969)
Money and Institutional Power
S. Ansolabehere (1999)
The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees
K. Poole (1987)
The organization of interests
H. N. Wieman (1985)
10.2307/1912934
A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
H. White (1980)
Non-market Strategies and Regulation in the U.S.
Yao (1995)
10.1016/0261-3794(83)90067-7
Money in congressional elections
G. C. Jacobson (1980)
10.2307/2111193
Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections
D. Green (1988)
10.1177/0951692800012002003
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
E. Aragonès (2000)
10.3998/mpub.8850
Information and legislative organization
K. Krehbiel (1991)
10.1214/AOMS/1177731868
The Fitting of Straight Lines if Both Variables are Subject to Error
A. Wald (1940)
10.1086/467385
The Market For Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?1
T. Stratmann (1998)
10.5860/choice.34-3564
Participation in Congress
R. Hall (1996)
10.3386/W7475
Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation
R. Kroszner (2000)
10.2307/1959075
The PAC directory : a complete guide to political action committees
Marvin I. Weinberger (1982)
Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral
Aragones (1999)
Coalition Maintenance: Politicians, Parties, and Organized Groups.
McCarty (2000)
Does Electoral Accountability Affect the journal of law and economics
Timothy Besley
10.3998/MPUB.23248
Positive theories of congressional institutions
K. Shepsle (1994)
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests
Press (1996)
10.2307/2297892
Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows
P. Ghosh (1995)
10.4324/9780203789223
Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting
K. Poole (1997)
10.1086/261731
Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986
J. Snyder (1990)
Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees
R. Kroszner (1996)
The LM Test and Its Application to Model Specification in Econometrics.
T. Breusch (1980)
10.1086/261954
Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House
S. Levitt (1994)
Public choice II
D. Müller (1989)
10.2307/2111799
Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract
N. Mccarty (1996)
10.1086/260996
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
B. Klein (1981)
10.1162/003355399556223
What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions
R. Kroszner (1997)
10.1016/0047-2727(85)90028-3
Candidate reputations and the 'incumbency effect'
M. Bernhardt (1985)
Premiums for High Quality Products as Rents to Reputation.
Shapiro (1983)
10.2307/2131991
Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986
Kevin B. Grier (1993)
10.1111/J.1468-0343.1992.TB00087.X
THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS*
Joseph E. Harrington (1992)
Competitive Lobbying for a Leg
Austin-Smith (1998)
10.1086/467360
How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting
T. Stratmann (1996)
10.1515/BAP.1999.1.1.7
Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics
D. Baron (1999)
Commitment and the Camthe journal of law and economics paign Contribution Contract
Nolan Mccarty (1996)
The Fitting of Straight Lines of Both Variables Are Subject
Wald (1994)
10.1086/279068
Notes on Evolution
(1909)
10.2307/2585397
How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth
G. Cox (1999)
10.2307/2111605
An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions
J. Snyder (1994)
Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation
R. Kroszner (1999)
10.2307/2595955
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities.
John Othick (1983)
10.1016/0024-3205(78)90098-X
Fitting straight lines when both variables are subject to error.
D. S. Riggs (1978)
10.2307/2946699
Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits
Timothy Besley (1993)
10.2307/j.ctt1dfntx8.8
Interest Group Politics
A. Cigler (1994)
Notes on the Evolution of the Congressional Committee System in the Twentieth Century
Randall S Kroszner (1997)
10.1007/BF00192880
Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
D. Austen-Smith (1992)
The Market for Congressional Votes: Is the Timing
Stratmann (1996)
The myth of democratic failure
D. Wittman (1995)
10.2307/2938299
Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
D. Abreu (1990)
10.2307/447661
Congress, keystone of the Washington establishment
M. Fiorina (1977)
10.2307/2109627
Localized market power in the U.S. airline industry
W. Evans (1993)
Commitment and the Cam
McCarty (1992)
PAC Directory: A Complete Guide
Weinberger (1940)
10.2307/1885458
Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives
R. Zeckhauser (1969)
10.2307/1957799
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition
K. Shepsle (1972)
10.1080/01621459.1962.10480664
An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias
A. Zellner (1962)
10.2307/1963640
The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity
A. Glazer (1990)
10.2307/1913643
Regression Quantiles
R. Koenker (2007)
10.2307/1911307
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
D. Fudenberg (1986)
10.2307/2585838
Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints
T. Stratmann (2000)
10.2307/1060799
Money for nothing : politicians, rent extraction, and political extortion
D. Lee (1998)
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress
(1991)
10.1086/261833
Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees
T. Stratmann (1992)
10.1023/A:1005077102181
Money for nothing: Politicians, rent extraction and political extortion
P. C. Hill (1998)
10.2307/1962767
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
R. Hall (1990)
10.2307/1881782
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
C. Shapiro (1983)
10.2307/2150462
The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House.
Randall B. Ripley (1979)
10.2307/2109998
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?
T. Stratmann (1995)
10.1007/BF01718551
Economic theory of democracy
M. Boss (1974)
10.1111/J.1465-7295.1991.TB01250.X
Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions
Kevin B. Grier (1991)
Money and Institutional
Ansolabehere (1990)
10.2307/2111156
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
T. Gilligan (1989)
The Theory of Industrial Organization
G. Hendrikse (1989)
Ambiguity in Equilibrium for Two Party Electoral Competition
Enriqueta Aragones
Econometric Analysis. 3d ed
Greene (1997)
Money for nothing
Fred S. Mcchesney (1997)
10.2202/1469-3569.1002
Congressional Committees as Reputation-building Mechanisms
R. Kroszner (2000)
10.1177/1532673X00028003001
Coalitional Maintenance
N. Mccarty (2000)
10.2307/2937875
The Politics of Ambiguity
A. Alesina (1987)
10.1016/0277-9390(93)90098-A
Open secrets: The encyclopedia of congressional money & politics
A. Piscitelli (1993)
10.1086/261528
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
B. Weingast (1988)
Does Electoral Accountability Affect
Besley (1985)
10.1086/467243
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
Jr. James M. Snyder (1992)
10.2307/20041465
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
W. Diebold (1982)
10.1093/OXFORDJOURNALS.OEP.A042114
The internal organization of government
Jean Tirole (1994)
Ambiguity in Equilibrium
Aragones (2000)
Congressional Committees
1163–87. Kroszner (1998)
10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_7
Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California’s state legislative races
Kermit Daniel (1997)



This paper is referenced by
WP / 1 9 / 171 Bank Lobbying : Regulatory Capture and Beyond
T. Lambert (2018)
The Hidden Gatekeepers: Early Money Donors and Congressional Elections
Melissa Bell (2009)
Political Pledges as Credible Commitments
Michael Tomz (2012)
THREE ESSAYS ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONGRESS
C. Wang (2004)
Reputation Sells -Compensation Payments in the Political Sphere
Corinna Ahlfeld (2010)
Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond, WP/19/171, August 2019
T. Lambert (2018)
10.1007/S11127-019-00669-5
Politicians’ coherence and government debt
G. Bellettini (2020)
10.20381/RUOR-20718
Essays in Finance and Politics
Dieu-Donne Donald Emmanuel (2017)
10.2308/ATAX-52026
Tax-Related Corporate Political Activity Research: A Literature Review
J. Barrick (2019)
10.1287/mksc.2016.1017
Competition in Corruptible Markets
S. Singh (2017)
10.2139/SSRN.2313232
Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives
Adam Bonica (2016)
10.1002/SMJ.2682
Investor Reaction to Covert Corporate Political Activity
T. Werner (2017)
10.2139/ssrn.2247060
Congressional Influence as a Determinant of Subprime Lending
S. Gabriel (2013)
10.1016/J.EJPOLECO.2012.09.005
Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence
Emma Aisbett (2013)
Does campaign finance imply political favors? The case of the 1998 Brazilian elections
Erik Feijen (2005)
10.1007/S11293-008-9147-5
PAC Contributions from Sectors of the Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002
R. Bennett (2008)
10.2139/ssrn.917871
THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNVERIFIABLE FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING: EVIDENCE FROM THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOODWILL
K. Ramanna (2007)
10.1007/0-387-28038-3_8
Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature
T. Stratmann (2005)
Response of special interests to legislators ’ activity : campaign contributions of the U . S . financial industry and bills sponsorship and co – sponsorship
Dieu-Donne Donald Emmanuel (2017)
10.1016/J.JFINECO.2013.10.008
The Role of Stock Ownership by US Members of Congress on the Market for Political Favors
Ahmed Tahoun (2014)
Three Essays on the Political Economy of Agricultural Programs.
Scott Evans Callahan (2017)
10.1017/AAE.2019.9
Do Campaign Contributions from Farmers Influence Agricultural Policy? Evidence From a 2008 Farm Bill Amendment Vote to Curtail Cotton Subsidies
S. Callahan (2019)
10.1016/J.JACCECO.2007.11.006
The Implications of Unverifiable Fair-Value Accounting: Evidence from the Political Economy of Goodwill Accounting
K. Ramanna (2008)
10.2139/ssrn.3035254
Government Subsidies and Corporate Fraud
Aneesh Raghunandan (2018)
10.1002/SMJ.2006
In Search of El Dorado: The Elusive Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments
M. Hadani (2013)
10.1111/JOFI.12725
The Politics of Foreclosures: The Politics of Foreclosures
S. Agarwal (2018)
10.1016/J.IREF.2015.09.008
Political connection, government policy, and investor trading: Evidence from an emerging market
Chih-Yung Lin (2016)
10.2139/ssrn.3128829
Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond
Deniz Igan (2018)
10.1177/0007650316679991
Corporate Political Transparency
Murad A. Mithani (2019)
10.1016/J.JCORPFIN.2020.101768
Transactional and Relational Approaches to Political Connections and the Cost of Debt
Taufiq Arifin (2018)
10.1007/S11127-009-9555-3
Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions
Ivan Pastine (2010)
10.2139/SSRN.2003619
Lobbying, Operating Performance, and Corporate Governance
M. Humphery-Jenner (2012)
See more
Semantic Scholar Logo Some data provided by SemanticScholar